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The Ukrainian's individualism is most evident in his attitude to the social order, to the principle of the place of the community in society. He repudiates all forms of communal life which call for strict discipline and absolute obedience, without thinking that such a repudiation may be disastrous for the security of general interests and even, in the long run, for the personal advantage of the individual. His individualism as a social principle regards the individual as an end in himself, while the community is merely the sum or union of individuals and as such is only the means of guaranteeing the welfare of the individual. According to this national viewpoint, society — in Ukrainian "hromada" — is a voluntary union of individuals who, for the moment, are willing to work together for common aims, but who reserve the right to leave the union or even to attack it with every means in their power if they find that it is threatening their personal freedom, or when personal interest is greater than the interest of the community. We find a historical example of this attitude in the well-known military organisation of the Zaporoghian Cossacks, who regarded themselves as independent and free citizens, and only acknowledged their duty towards the community in so far as they considered it essential to the security and welfare of all.

In the history of Ukraine there are only too many cases where an exaggerated individualism prevented the formation of tradition as a supreme factor in building up a state, and where the historical existence of the entire people was at the mercy of conflicting forces which, in the absence of all desire to cooperate, were of necessity detrimental to the future of the state.

The structure of Russian society, called "mir" is diametrically opposed to this; it falls into the other extreme as the intellectual expression of the will of the community which completely absorbs personal independence. The essence and leading principle of the Russian "mir" is the compulsion inherent in the superior agency as the instrument of God's will. All rebellion against this divine compulsion is a grievous sin which the simple Russian cannot be expected to commit. This view was and is the most favorable condition for the birth and development of every absolute regime.

In contrast to Western European thought, it is characteristic for the Russian's view of the world that he definitely rejects the personal and always seeks to take his stand on a certain intellectual collectivism. In spite of the zealous efforts of some Russian scholars to explain and water down this quality of the Russian psyche, we must admit the truth of the assertion of the slavophils that the Russian spirit is collectivist, in the sense that it detests personal freedom, all kinds of contract conditions and individual property; that it prefers collectivist forms of economy was illustrated in the past by the traditional and typically Russian "Obshchina". And the collectivist experiments which have been carried out in the Soviet Union in modern times have shown that collectivist measures of the communist government met with no resistance to speak of in Russia proper, while peasants in Ukraine were ready to fight to the death in defense of the principle of private property as the fundament of western culture, and in spite of desperate conditions, actually did so.

If we wish to evaluate the principles of the Ukrainian view of the world adequately, we must study the structure of his psyche and reveal those qualities and functions that lend it its spiritual character. What strikes us most at the outset is the emphasis on the emotions; the preponderance of feelings over reason. The entire conduct of the Ukrainian is regulated, not by reason, "ratio", so characteristic for the entire philosophy of the Occident, but by profound feeling. This is a characteristic of all Slavs whose passions usually run the whole gamut of emotions. Slavs in general, and Ukrainians in particular, are capable of boundless enthusiasm which, at the first reverse, is followed by equally boundless apathy or despair. They are capable of deep love, which plays a predominant part in their psychical life, but negligible circumstances can often convert this feeling into its opposite, into a hatred for which no reason can be given other than from the emotional point of view. This lack of balance, these extreme variations within the emotions, make it difficult to preserve order and stability within; they are an important and at times decisive handicap to the formation of any system in intellectual work.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Turning of the Cultural Tide

The Ukrainian Communists did not realize what they were doing when they launched their campaign against the bourgeois intellectuals and the aged scholars in the Academy of Sciences. For the first time since the period of Ukrainization had started, they had definitely called the attention of Moscow to the existence in Ukraine of a survival of the old independent mode of thinking which had animated the Ukrainian leaders in the struggle for an independent state of their own and they had coined a name for it, bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism. That was to recur again and again and lead to their own ruin.

It is remarkable that neither Skrypnyk nor Khvylovy realized this earlier. Both men in their own way were seriously threatening the unity of the Soviet Union, to which as an ideal they were loyal. Both men, Skrypnyk in the political field and Khvylovy in literature, realized the danger to Ukraine of substituting Russianism for Communism. Both men accepted in different senses the basic ideals of Communism and both believed in a Communist International which would offer all peoples full rights of cultural and political development. Neither one understood that the Comintern was a shadow structure which was totally dependent upon the forces operating in Moscow and that the situation in 1928 and 1929 was basically different from that ten years before.

In the RSFSR the charter of liberty for the fellow travellers which had been promulgated in 1925 was practically abolished by the granting of extreme power of control to Averbakh and the RAPP (the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) which, to all intents and purposes, was issuing orders as to how the writers should support the Five Year Plan.

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LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE[1]

By HAROLD R. WEINSTEIN

ONE of the most painful lessons mankind has learned since the rise of nationalism in the last hundred years is that language diversity fosters conflicts between states and among peoples living within one state but speaking different languages. Conversely, language uniformity makes for unity. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries most governments have strongly desired such uniformity. In some countries, as in America, assimilation into one language has been achieved by allowing national groups the free use of their native languages, and by relying upon the advance of education and of commercial and industrial development to break down the barriers those languages erect between various linguistic groups. In the period before the First World War, many governments sought language uniformity by forcibly repressing the languages of minorities, by Germanizing, Magyarizing, Russifying their national minority groups. Of no government was this more true than of that of the old Russian Empire, in which the "minorities" — that is, the groups other than the Great-Russians — constituted over half the population. But by attempting to suppress the languages of the Ukrainians, Georgians, Tatars and so on, the Tsarist régime did not achieve its goal of unity; rather, it aroused a host of nationalist movements which put language repression first on the bill of grievances against the government and which helped drive Tsarism to its death.

Lenin believed that the Tsarist method defeated its own ends and that the goal of unity had to be approached by other paths. First of all, literacy would have to precede any attempt to obtain language uniformity: as long as none other than oral means of communication existed between the minorities and the Russians, the Russian language could not really permeate the minorities and break down their national horizons. Literacy, of course, could be most easily reached by universal education in the minority languages themselves. Then, once the art of reading was mastered and great cultural vistas were opened to the minorities, they would be in a position to go ahead and adopt Russian as a second language. The Russian language would appeal to them because it is the language of a stronger culture than

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those the minorities possessed; and the necessity for knowing Russian would be heightened by drawing the minorities into the industrial, commercial and political life of the country as a whole. Meanwhile, literacy in the minority languages would facilitate the spread of communist doctrines stressing the international solidarity of the working-class against capitalism. To achieve unity while allowing the free use of minority languages might be the long — and perhaps very dangerous — way around, but Lenin believed it would be the only effective way in a backward, heterogeneous country like Russia.

The Soviet leaders were so certain that eventual lingustic uniformity could be attained only through temporary diversity that they went further in emphasizing minority languages than any state has ever gone: they made vigorous attempts to foster the actual use of the minority languages, to "nationalize" (i.e., "Ukrainize," "Armenianize," "Tartarize") political organizations, administrative apparatus, factory managements, trade-unions, military units, newspapers, books, theatres and schools, among the minorities. In their desire to retreat from the old Imperial policy of Russification, they leaned over so far backward that they introduced the element of compulsion in the opposite direction: they forced the national minorities and the Russians living among them to use the local languages in political, economic and cultural life, stopping short only at the threshold of the individual's private world. The ultimate effect of this policy upon the increase or decrease of nationalism among the minorities is not yet apparent, and the fate of such nationalism may hinge upon such factors as economic prosperity, political liberty and developments in the field of international relations; but the process of nationalizing the political, economic and cultural life of the minorities is an experiment which deserves more attention from the non-Soviet political and scholarly world than it has received.

In the field of education, the Soviet régime has followed a four-fold policy: first to establish a school system embracing all children; secondly, to promote the spread of communist doctrines by integrating them into the curriculum; thirdly, to nationalize the school system by introducing the languages of the minorities as the languages of instruction in schools attended by children of the minorities; and, fourthly, to pave the way for eventual assimilation by providing for the study of Russian as a separate subject in the schools of the minorities. The first two aspects of this policy are complex subjects, each of which deserves a separate study. The present discussion will therefore treat only of the linguistic phases of the Soviet educational policy: the nationalization of education — that is, the use of minority

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languages as the media of instruction; and the study of Russian as a separate subject.

In setting out to nationalize education, the Soviet régime has encountered many obstacles: Russian nationalists — and there were some even among the Communists — opposed the policy; text-books and teachers were scarce; and the more backward minorities did not even possess a written language of their own. As the exigencies of space prevent the investigation of all the problems encountered in the nationalization of education, this study will be limited to examining the policy as applied in the Ukraine; that is, to the Ukrainians and to the other minorities — Poles, Jews, Germans and others — living among them. The Ukrainians, it may be noted, are the largest minority in the Soviet Union; they are the most significant from the point of view of current international relations; and the difficulties encountered by the nationalization policy in the Ukraine were sufficiently complex to provide some insight into the policy as a whole.

Among the Ukrainians, as among the other minorities, the nationalization of education has stemmed from the program on the national question which Lenin formulated before the overthrow of the Tsarist régime. This program, intended to overcome minority nationalism, had to assign a conspicuous place to the language question. To many Ukrainians the treatment of their language by the Imperial government appeared even more onerous than the political oppression which was meted out to Russians and Ukrainians alike. The Ukrainian language was regarded by the government as an uncouth dialect of the Russian language; it was harried from the schools; and it was badgered throughout the literary, scholarly and theatrical worlds. The resulting Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin believed, was a threat to the international unity of the Ukrainian and Russian masses, a unity he regarded as essential for the achievement of socialism; and this Ukrainian nationalism would have to be met with the promise of linguistic equality for the Ukrainians and for all other nationalities. This conception was written into the program on the national question adopted by the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party in 1913, a program which was first intended to apply to a period of "capitalist democracy" but was retained after the establishment of the Soviet government in 1917. The first point in the program stated: "Insofar as national peace is possible in a capitalist society, which is based on exploitation, profits and wrangling, such peace is obtainable only by means of a thoroughly, consistently democratic, republican governmental structure, guaranteeing complete equality to all nations and languages, and by the inclusion in the con-

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stitution of a basic law nullifying every kind of privilege of one nation and every kind of violation of the right of the national minorities."[2]

While defending this point in the program, Lenin explained that he did not desire to turn Russia into a "Babelesque confusion" in which one national group could not communicate with another; and he thought that sooner or later the minorities of Russia would become assimilated, probably through adopting the Russian language he cherished so highly and which he expected would be taught as a subject in the schools.[3] However, Lenin argued, such assimilation could be achieved not by compulsion, not by the Tsarist method of repression, but by the natural process of commercial and industrial development and intercourse. To force the minorities to study the Russian language by "the use of the stick" merely estranged them and turned them against that language. If, on the other hand, the minorities were allowed to use their own language in education, they would willingly accept the study of Russian also and would, as in America, voluntarily use it because of its advantage in economic intercourse. Hence, wherever minorities lived compactly, their languages would be used as the medium of instruction in the schools; and where members of minorities were isolated among other nationalities, they would be given the opportunity to study the language of their nationality.

Although the Provisional Government, ushered in by the February Revolution in 1917, intended to alter the policy of Russification and proclaimed linguistic freedom for the minorities, it did not succeed in overcoming the hostility of the minority nationalists who were then rapidly extending their influence among the peasantry. The Provisional Government, for example, wrangled with the Ukrainian nationalists not only on the question of political autonomy, but also on the expediency of Ukrainizing some of the army units; and in the Ukraine itself the former Tsarist officials remaining at their posts obstructed the Ukrainization of the school system. As the discontent of the peasantry with the land policy of the Provisional Government fed the flames of Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin was more than ever resolved to overcome minority hostility by, among other things, establishing linguistic equality.

After the October Revolution had put the Bolsheviks in control, the Soviet régime introduced into the schools the policy of national

[2] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach i Rešenijach S'ezdov, Konferencii i Plenumov Ts.K., 1898–1932* (Moscow, 1933), I, 238–240.

[3] For the views of Lenin contained in this paragraph, see Lenin, V. I., *Sočinenija* (Moscow, 1935), XVI, pp. 509, 551–554, 595–596; XVII, pp. 66, 89, 114–115, 133, 139–154, 178–181, 361.

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languages as the medium of instruction. Lenin stigmatized as "Great-Russian Chauvinists," those people in the Commissariat of Education who favored teaching only in the Russian language; and referring specifically to the Ukrainians in a resolution he wrote for the Central Committee of the Communist Party, he stated that if the Bolsheviks wanted to overcome the hostility of the Ukrainian peasants (a hostility quite clearly evident during the Civil War from 1918 to 1920), the Ukrainian language could not be pushed into the background of either educational or political life.[4] Stalin argued that education in the minority languages would facilitate the raising of the cultural level of the minorities to that of the Russians and would thereby forge bonds of union between them.[5] The educational policy for the minorities, he stated, must have it as its aim: "to develop national culture; to build up a wide network of courses and schools for both general education and vocational and technical training, teaching in the native languages, for the purpose of training Soviet, party, trade-union and economic cadres from among the native people."[6] These views of Lenin and Stalin were incorporated into party resolutions, adopted in the decade after 1919, on education and on national policy generally.[7]

It was, of course, much easier to make speeches and pass resolutions than to realize the aims set forth therein. Even in the relatively advanced Ukraine it promised to be very difficult to establish a "wide network" of schools giving instruction in the national languages. The heritage of buildings, school supplies and qualified teachers bequeathed by Tsarism was meager in comparison with the needs of a régime aspiring to universal education: in the Kiev Educational District, for example, only twenty-two of every thousand people attended school in 1913.[8] Educational facilities, moreover, were reduced by the disastrous Civil War, during which constant fighting, famine, typhus, cholera, economic collapse and bankruptcy levied a high tax on the educational system; and the lack of funds and personnel long hampered its recuperation.[9] By 1924 the system approached its status

[4] *Ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 155, 552–554.

[5] J. Stalin, *Stati i Reči ob Ukraine* (Kiev, 1936), pp. 111–112, 194–195.

[6] J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (New York, 1935), p. 208.

[7] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach . . .* I, pp. 155, 637.

[8] The Kiev Educational District comprised the provinces of Kiev, Poltava, Podolia, Volhynia and Chernigov. The number of pupils is from Ministerstvo Narodnogo Prosvieshcheniia, *Vsepodanneiši Otčet, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1915), p. 196. The estimate of the population is from Centralny Statističeski Komitet, *Ežegodnik Rossii, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1913), pp. 33–59.

[9] For the condition of the educational system up to 1924, see *Urkainska Socialistična Radianska Respublika. Zbirnik Spravozdan Narodnich Komisarijativ i centralnich ustanov U.S.R.R. ta Upolnivaženich Narodnich Komisarijativ R.S.F.S.R. 5-mu Vseukrainskomu Z'izdovi Rad Ukraini. Otčet Narodnogo Komisariati Oswiti U.S.R.R. za 1920 rik* (*Kharkov*,